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I. INTRODUCTION
Charles Andrew Bates, the Defendant in State v. Bates,' listened to his
friends and former neighbors give testimony about his character, as he sat at
* J.D. candidate 2004, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center;
B.A., University of South Florida. I would like to acknowledge and thank my loving wife,
Liz, for her unwavering support, Professor Michael Dale for his role as advisor and mentor,
and members of the Nova Law Review junior staff for their tireless efforts.
1. Fictional case. Bates' story is designed to give the reader an understanding of
how a sentencing hearing progresses.
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a table in a hot Florida courtroom. Bates' defense attorney called these
character witnesses in a final effort to save his client's life. The jury has
already returned a guilty verdict on one count of first-degree murder;
therefore, Bates is facing either life imprisonment or death. The Defendant
is in danger of the jury recommending death to the judge if his attorney is
unable to present mitigating circumstances that equalize or outweigh the
several aggravating circumstances presented by the prosecutor.
Prior to the defense attorney's attempt at presenting mitigating
circumstances, the prosecutor presented evidence to demonstrate aggravat-
ing circumstances. During the prosecutor's argument, she presented several
pieces of evidence, which could have been classified as aggravating factors.
The prosecutor demonstrated, as she had done to establish guilt at trial, that
the Defendant stabbed his seventy-two year-old victim twenty-six times.
After killing the victim, the Defendant looted the victim's apartment,
stealing precious family heirlooms and a modest savings of cash. The
prosecutor also demonstrated that the Defendant kept the victim bound and
gagged in a dark bathroom for two days, providing limited food and water
before killing her. The prosecutor closed her argument by stating that
according to the state statute, three aggravating factors were present. First,
3the Defendant killed the victim in an especially heinous and cruel manner.
Second, the victim was an elderly woman, whom he physically and mentally
abused, and killed.4  Finally, the Defendant committed this murder for
pecuniary gain. 5
2. This sentencing hearing is similar to a sentencing hearing in Alabama, Delaware,
or Florida. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45 (1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (1995); FLA.
STAT. § 921.141 (2001). In any of these three states, the following will occur. After a guilty
verdict has been rendered in a capital case, the jury listens to all of the evidence presented by
both sides in a separate sentencing hearing. Upon completion of the arguments by both
attorneys, the jurors weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. However, if the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, then the jury may
recommend death. If the mitigating circumstances outweigh or equal the aggravating
circumstances, then the jury must recommend life imprisonment. Regardless of the jury's
recommendation, the judge makes the final decision. The judge weighs the evidence as the
jury did, and he or she can impose death or life imprisonment as a penalty. ALA. CODE
§ 13A-5-45 (1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (1995); FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (2001).
3. In Florida, committing a capital felony in an "especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel" manner is considered an aggravating factor. Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(h) (2001).
4. In Florida, committing a capital felony against an "elderly person. . . resulting in
great bodily harm" is considered an aggravating factor. § 921.141(5)(d).
5. In Florida, committing a capital felony for "pecuniary gain" can be considered an
aggravating factor. § 921.141(5)(f).
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Bates' attorney focused on the Defendant's age, mental state at the time
of the crime, and limited criminal history to mitigate the aggravating factors
presented by the prosecutor. First, the defense attorney explained to the jury
that while the defendant is currently nineteen, he was only eighteen at the
time of the murder.6 Thus, while the law sees the Defendant as an adult, his
young age should be considered when analyzing his decisions. Second, the
defense attorney attempted to reason the Defendant's actions based upon his
mental state at the time of the murder.7 To do this, the Defendant's friends
testified that they had taken illegal drugs with the Defendant only one day
prior to the Defendant's felonious act, causing the Defendant to react
aggressively. Finally, the defense attorney presented the Defendant's limited
8
criminal history. Bates had only been arrested one time prior, for a
misdemeanor.
Upon completion of the arguments, the judge gave the jury brief
instructions, and allowed them to deliberate so they might form a recom-
mendation of either life imprisonment or death. The jury returned after two
short hours. The jury informed the judge that they had reached a decision.
By a vote of twelve to zero, they found that the Defendant's age, limited
criminal history, and mental state at the time of the murder were sufficient
mitigating circumstances to offset the aggravating factors presented by the
prosecution. Thus, the jury recommended that the judge impose a sentence
of life imprisonment.
One week later, the court reconvened for the judge's decision. The
judge explained that while he gives great weight to the jury's recommenda-
tion, he is not bound by it, and he must rule appropriately. Moreover, the
judge explained that while the jury is often swayed by the emotion of
witnesses at a sentencing trial, his experience and understanding of the
procedure allows him to see things more objectively than juries might.
Therefore, the judge explained that he was ready to make his ruling. As all
ears in the courtroom listened attentively, the judge sentenced Charles
Andrew Bates to death by the electric chair.9 The judge stated that he was
6. In Florida, the "age of the defendant at the time of the crime" can be considered a
mitigating factor. § 921.141(6)(g).
7. In Florida, the aggravating factors may be mitigated if "[t]he capital felony was
committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance." § 921.141(6)(b).
8. In Florida, lack of a significant criminal history can be a mitigating factor.
§ 921.141(6)(a).
9. Florida continues to use the electric chair for executions. DEATH PENALTY INFO.
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not persuaded by the argument that the Defendant's age was a mitigating
circumstance. When the judge weighed the three aggravating circumstances
against the two remaining mitigating circumstances, he felt death was the
appropriate punishment.
Although the sentencing hearing previously described is fictional, the
possibility of its likeness becoming a reality is true, due to the current
process required by death penalty statutes in eight states.' 0 In those eight
states, either: 1) a judge makes the decision alone;' 1 2) a panel of judges
makes the decision together;12 or 3) a judge makes the decision with a
recommendation from the jury, 13 as was the case in the Bates' trial. As of
April 1, 2001, a total of 3701 inmates resided on death row. 14 Of those 3701
inmates, 758 were sentenced to death by one of the three previously
mentioned processes.15
This article will deal directly with the 758 inmates who were sentenced
to death by a judge or panel of judges. Initially, this article will briefly
analyze the effects of Furman v. Georgia.16 In the analysis of Furman, the
article will discuss the Court's holding, as well as Furman's effects on the
death penalty in 1972. Finally, this section will discuss the implementation
of aggravating and mitigating factors into state death penalty statutes, as a
direct result of Furman.
In Part II, this article will survey the various ways states have formed
their death penalty statutes. In this section, the article will first discuss those
state statutes where a judge, or panel of judges makes the sentencing
determination, independent of a jury. Next, the article will discuss state
10. Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska.
See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45 (1994); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (West 2001 & Supp.
2001); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-103 (West 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209
(1995); FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (2001); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2002);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (1995).
11. Adam Liptak, Fewer Death Sentences Likely if Juries Make Ultimate Decision,
Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2002, at A19. See also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703
(West 2001 & Supp. 2001); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2002); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-18-301 (2001).
12. Liptak, supra note 11. See also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-103 (West
2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (1995).
13. Liptak, supra note 11. See also ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45 (1994); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, § 4209 (1995); FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (2001).
14. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., DEATH Row INMATES BY STATE, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/DRowlnfo.html (Apr. 1, 2001). At the time of the writing of
this article, this was the most current information.
15. See id.
16. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
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statutes that require a judge to determine the sentence, after receiving a
recommendation from the jury. Finally, this section will analyze a state
statute that requires the jury to make the final sentencing determination, and
does not allow the judge to overrule the jury's decision, as he can in other
states. 17
In Part IV, this article will begin to look at landmark United States
Supreme Court cases that set the stage for Ring v. Arizona.18 In this section,
it becomes apparent that the Court is conflicted over the appropriate level of
involvement by the judge in the sentencing process. The first case analyzed
to demonstrate this point is Walton v. Arizona.19 In Walton, a 1990 case, the
Court upheld the Arizona death penalty statute, finding that it did not violate
the Sixth Amendment. The article then shifts forward to the year 2000 and
discusses Apprendi v. New Jersey,21 another significant United States
Supreme Court case. In the discussion of Apprendi, the paper will show how
a conflict between Apprendi and Walton existed, even though the Court
22stated in Apprendi that Walton remained good law. Also at this juncture,
the article will discuss Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion in Apprendi,
which predicted that appeals, such as Ring, would be quickly forthcoming.
23
In Part V, this article will analyze Ring. In the analysis of Ring, the
paper will show that Apprendi and Walton could not coexist, and how the
Court chose not to tip-toe the line any longer. Also in this section, the article
will revisit Justice O'Connor in another dissenting opinion, as she opines
that the majority sided with the wrong case, Apprendi, and instead should
have chosen Walton.24
Finally, in Part VI, this article will discuss the legal ramifications of the
Ring decision. There are both long and short-term effects of Ring, and in
this section, the article will examine both. In the short-term, will those
currently on death row, who were sentenced by a judge, have their sentences
commuted, as was done after Furman; or will they only receive new
sentencing trials? In the long-term, what will this mean for current death
penalty statutes, or for the administration of the death penalty? Will Ring
17. Liptak, supra note 11. See also ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45 (1994); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, § 4209 (1995); FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (2001).
18. 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002).
19. 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
20. Id. at 639.
21. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
22. Id. at 496.
23. Id. at 551 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
24. Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2449 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
2003]
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only be a speed bump, slowing down executions until state legislatures can
cleverly create new death penalty statutes that comply with the Ring ruling,
or will this decision result in a permanent slowing of executions in this
country?
II. FURMAN V. GEORGIA
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia25 is
the most significant reason death penalty statutes exist in their current form.
Prior to Furman, the Court did not interpret punishment by death as cruel,
"unless the manner of execution [could] be said to be inhuman and
barbarous. 26 However, as Justice Douglas pointed out in his concurring
opinion, "the Eighth Amendment 'must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.",,27 Thus,
the Furman Court sought to measure the death penalty against the existing
"standards of decency., 28
A. The Court's Opinion
In Furman, three convicted felons, two from Georgia and one from
Texas, were sentenced to death by juries in their respective states. 29 Furman,
from Georgia, was sentenced to death for murder, 30 while Jackson, the other
petitioner from Georgia, and Branch, the petitioner from Texas, were
sentenced to death for rape.3' All three petitioners were black, and none had
32
an education exceeding high school, as was the case for a large number of
defendants sentenced to death at that time. As a result, the petitioners'
attorney argued that the death penalty was imposed arbitrarily because a
25. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
26. Id. at 241 (citing In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890)). The Eighth
Amendment states that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added).
27. Furman, 408 U.S. at 242 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
28. See id.
29. Id. at 239.
30. Id. at 252.
31. Id. at 252-53.
32. Furman, 408 U.S. at 252-53.
33. Id. at 249-50.
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large majority of deathrow inmates were minorities with limited education, 34
thus, the capital punishment statutes were a violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
The sole issue addressed in Furman was whether the "imposition and
carrying out of the death penalty in [these cases] constitute cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?, 36 The
decision of the Court in Furman was five to four, with the five justices
making up the majority filing separate opinions.37 The majority held that
"the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases
constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments, 38 and thus, was unconstitutional. All five
concurring Justices rationalized their decision based on inequality.
39
"Justices Brennan and Marshall concluded that the death penalty was per se
unconstitutional, in part based on its inevitably unequal application. The
other three concurring Justices, Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White, found
fault with the inequality rooted in the sentencing procedure, as opposed to
the punishment itself.4 ' Justice White wrote in his concurring opinion that
"the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would render
unconstitutional 'capital sentencing procedures that are purposely con-
structed to allow maximum possible variation from one case to the next, and
[that] provide no mechanism to prevent that consciously maximized
34. Scott W. Howe, The Troubling Influence of Equality in Constitutional Criminal
Procedure: From Brown to Miranda, Furman and Beyond, 54 VAND. L. REV. 359, 404
(2001).
35. Id. The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution states that
"[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishment inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution states that
[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
36. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239.
37. Id. at 240.
38. Id. at 239-40.
39. Howe, supra note 34, at 404 (citing Stephen P. Garvey, "As the Gentle Rain From
Heaven": Mercy In Capital Sentencing, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 989, 997 (1996)).
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variation from reflecting merely random or arbitrary choice."'' 42 Thus, the
Court left the door open for state legislatures to devise a system, whereby a
defendant could be sentenced to death, if procedurally the sentencing state
could avoid random or arbitrary choice of those defendants selected for
death.
B. After Furman v. Georgia
During the three years following Furman, thirty-five states passed new
death penalty statutes.43  Most states elected to implement statutes that
mandated execution upon conviction.4 Conversely, a small number of states
created statutes mandating a separate post-conviction sentencing hearing,
combined with guidelines designed to funnel the judge's or jury's decision
in a certain direction, based upon the circumstances surrounding the criminal
act.45 In 1976, the Court was asked to determine the constitutionality of the
46
revised capital punishment statutes. Therefore, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in five cases, originating in North Carolina, Louisiana, Georgia,
Florida, and Texas.47 Of the five state statutes analyzed by the Court, North
Carolina and Louisiana mandated capital punishment upon conviction for
murder, whereas Georgia, Florida, and Texas mandated a separate post-con-
viction sentencing hearing.48 Ultimately, the Court found North Carolina's
and Louisiana's capital punishment statutes unconstitutional, on the same
grounds as Furman. However, the Court held that the death penalty
statutes of Georgia, Florida, and Texas were constitutional, 50 because the
guidelines put into place by those state legislatures reduced the "'substantial
42. Furman, 408 U.S. at 248 n.11 (White, J., concurring) (quoting McGautha v.
California, 402 U.S. 183, 248-49 (1971)) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
43. Howe, supra note 34, at 405 n.241 (citing John W. Poulos, The Supreme Court,
Capital Punishment and the Substantive Criminal Law: The Rise and Fall of Mandatory
Capital Punishment, 28 ARIZ. L. REV. 143, 226 (1986)).
44. Id. at 405-06.
45. Id. at 406.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Howe, supra note 34, at 406.
49. Id. at 406-07 (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (rejecting
the North Carolina system); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (rejecting the
Louisiana statute)).
50. Id. at 406 (citing to Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding the
Georgia system); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (upholding the Florida scheme);
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (upholding the Texas system)).
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risk' that the capital sanction would be imposed 'in an arbitrary and
capricious manner."' 5' Hence, the Court effectively gave notice to state
legislatures that it was necessary for any sentencing scheme to somehow
narrow the number of defendants eligible for the death penalty.
IH. SURVEY OF STATE DEATH PENALTY STATUTES
States have created three different procedural ways to impose capital
punishment. The first procedural design mandates that a single judge, or
panel of judges, independently make a finding and weighing of aggravating
or mitigating circumstances, before imposing a sentence. The second
procedural scheme requires a judge to make a finding and weighing of any
aggravating or mitigating circumstances after the jury has made a sentencing
recommendation to the judge based upon their finding of aggravating or
mitigating circumstances.53  The third procedural style calls for a jury to
determine the sentence based upon their finding and weighing of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances. 5 In the third procedural style, the judge does
not make the final decision as he or she would in the first two procedural
styles.55
A. State Statutes That Require the Judge to Impose a Sentence,
Independent of a Jury
Five states require a judge, without any recommendation from the jury,
to impose a sentence in capital cases.56  Of these five states, Arizona,57
51. Id. at 406 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188 (plurality opinion)).
52. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (West 2001 & Supp. 2001); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 16-11-103 (West 2001); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2002); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-18-301 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (1995). This process was
declared unconstitutional in Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002). See infra Part V for
more details on Ring.
53. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45 (1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (1995); FLA.
STAT. § 921.141 (2001).
54. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-603 (Michie 1997).
55. See Liptak, supra note 11.
56. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (West 2001 & Supp. 2001); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 16-11-103 (West 2001); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2002); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-18-301 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (1995). This process was
declared unconstitutional in Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2449. See infra Part V for more details on
Ring.
57. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (West 2001 & Supp. 2001).
The Arizona statute states in relevant part:
20031
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A. A person guilty of first degree murder as defined in § 13-1105 shall suffer death or
imprisonment in the custody of the state department of corrections for life ....
C. When a defendant is found guilty of or pleads guilty to first degree murder as
defined in § 13-1105, the judge who presided at the trial or before whom the guilty
plea was entered, or any other judge in the event of the death, resignation, incapacity or
disqualification of the judge who presided at the trial or before whom the guilty plea
was entered, shall conduct a separate sentencing hearing to determine the existence or
nonexistence of the circumstances included in subsections G and H of this section, for
the purpose of determining the sentence to be imposed. The hearing shall be con-
ducted before the court alone. The court alone shall make all factual determinations
required by this section or the constitution of the United States or this state.
D. Any information relevant to any mitigating circumstances included in subsection H
of this section may be presented by either the prosecution or the defendant, regardless
of its admissibility under the rules governing admission of evidence at criminal trials,
but the admissibility of information relevant to any of the aggravating circumstances
set forth in subsection G of this section shall be governed by the rules of evidence at
criminal trials....
E. The court shall return a special verdict setting forth its findings as to the existence
or nonexistence of each of the circumstances set forth in subsection G of this section
and as to the existence of any of the circumstances included in subsection H of this
section. In evaluating the mitigating circumstances, the courts shall consider any
information presented by the victim regarding the murdered person and the impact of
the murder on the victim and other family members. The court shall not consider any
recommendation made by the victim regarding the sentence to be imposed.
F. In determining whether to impose a sentence of death or life imprisonment, the
court shall take into account the aggravating and mitigating circumstances included in
subsections G and H of this section and shall impose a sentence of death if the court
finds one or more of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in subsection G of this
section and that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call
for leniency.
G. The court shall consider the following aggravating circumstances:
1. The defendant has been convicted of another offense in the United States for which
under Arizona law a sentence of life imprisonment or death was imposable.
2. The defendant was previously convicted of a serious offense, whether preparatory or
completed.
3. In the commission of the offense the defendant knowingly created a grave risk of
death to another person or persons in addition to the person murdered during the
commission of the offense.
4. The defendant procured the commission of the offense by payment, or promise of
payment, of anything of pecuniary value.
5. The defendant committed the offense as consideration for the receipt, or in expecta-
tion of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value.
6. The defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved
manner.
10
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Idaho,58 and Montana' 9 call for a single judfe to impose the penalty, while
the two others, Nebraska and Colorado, require a panel of judges to
impose the sentence. For all five states, the judge is burdened with the task
of determining if any aggravating or mitigating circumstances were present
7. The defendant committed the offense while in the custody of or on authorized or
unauthorized release from the state department of corrections, a law enforcement
agency or a county or city jail.
8. The defendant has been convicted of one or more other homicides, as defined in §
13-1101, which were committed during the commission of the offense.
9. The defendant was an adult at the time the offense was committed or was tried as an
adult and the murdered person was under fifteen years of age or was seventy years of
age or older.
10. The murdered person was an on duty peace officer who was killed in the course of
performing his official duties and the defendant knew, or should have known, that the
murdered person was a peace officer.
H. The court shall consider as mitigating circumstances any factors proffered by the
defendant or the state which are relevant in determining whether to impose a sentence
less than death, including any aspect of the defendant's character, propensities or
record and any of the circumstances of the offense, including but not limited to the
following:
1. The defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to con-
form his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired, but not so
impaired as to constitute a defense to prosecution.
2. The defendant was under unusual and substantial duress, although not such as to
constitute a defense to prosecution.
3. The defendant was legally accountable for the conduct of another under the provi-
sions of § 13-303, but his participation was relatively minor, although not so minor as
to constitute a defense to prosecution.
4. The defendant could not reasonably have foreseen that his conduct in the course of
the commission of the offense for which the defendant was convicted would cause, or
would create a grave risk of causing, death to another person.
5. The defendant's age.
Id.
58. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2002). This section of the
Idaho statute is similar to the process provided in section 13-703 of the Arizona statute,
including a listing of aggravating and mitigating factors. Id.
59. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301, -303, -304 (2001). These three Montana statute
sections combine to form a process similar to section 13-703 of the Arizona statute, including
a listing of aggravating and mitigating factors. Id.
60. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (1995). The Nebraska statute is similar to section 13-
703 of the Arizona statute, except Nebraska uses a panel of judges to determine the
appropriate sentence in a capital case. Id.
61. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-103 (West 2001). The Colorado statute is very
similar to section 13-703 of the Arizona statute, except that Colorado mandates that a "panel
of three judges" conduct the sentencing hearing. Id.
2003]
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62during the crime. If the judge determines that such circumstances existed,
then the judge must weigh those circumstances to determine if the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating. 63 If they do, then the
judge can impose death; however, if the mitigating circumstances outweigh
the aggravating circumstances, then the judge cannot impose death.
64
B. State Statutes That Require the Jury to Make a Sentencing
Recommendation, but Mandate the Judge Make the Final Sentence
Determination
Three states require a judge to impose a sentence in capital cases after
first receiving a sentencing recommendation by a jury in a separate
sentencing hearing. Those states include Florida,6' Alabama, and
Delaware. In these three states, after a jury renders a guilty verdict, the• • • 68 " "
trial moves on to a separate sentencing hearing. In the sentencing hearing,
the jur determines if any aggravating circumstances existed during the
crime. If the answer is no, the jury then advises that life imprisonment
should be imposed.7° However, if an aggravating circumstance is found,
then the jury determines if any mitigating circumstances are present to offset
the aggravating circumstances. 71 The jury weighs all possible factors and
62. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (West 2001 & Supp. 2001); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 16-11-103 (West 2001); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2002); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-18-301 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (1995).
63. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (West 2001 & Supp. 2001); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 16-11-103 (West 2001); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2002); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-18-301 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (1995).
64. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (West 2001 & Supp. 2001); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 16-11-103 (West 2001); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2002); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-18-301 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (1995).
65. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (2001).
66. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(a) (1994).
67. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d) (1995).
68. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(a) (1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(b) (1995); FLA.
STAT. § 921.141(1) (2001).
69. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(e)(1) (1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(c)(3)(a)(1)
(1995); FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2)(a) (2001).
70. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(e)(1) (1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d) (1995);
FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3)(a) (2001).
71. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(e)(2) (1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(c)(3)(a)(2)
(1995); FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2)(b) (2001).
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renders a recommendation to the judge.12 Once the recommendation has
been made, the judge completes the same process as the jury, and renders his
or her decision." Even though the judge often times sides with the jury, he
or she is not required to do So. Thus, while the jury has input, the judge
makes the ultimate decision, as is done in Arizona, Colorado, Idaho,
Montana, and Nebraska.
C. State Statutes that Require the Jury to Determine a Sentence
The remaining twenty-eight states that allow caVital punishment require
the jury to impose the sentence, and not the judge. The statutes in these
states are similar to those in states where the judge makes the decision after
the jury rendered their sentencing recommendation. However, in these
76states, the jury renders a final decision, and not only a recommendation.
For example, section 5-4-604 of the Arkansas Code provides a list of
aggravating factors, 7 and section 5-4-605 of the Arkansas Code provides a
list of possible mitigating factors. 78 Both lists are very similar to those
factors found in the Florida Statutes discussed above. In states such as
Arkansas, even though relatively the same aggravating and mitigating factors
are weighed, the jury does this service exclusively.
LV. CASES THAT CREATED THE CONFLICT LEADING TO RING V. ARIZONA
A. Walton v. Arizona
In the case of Walton v. Arizona,79 Walton was convicted of first-degree
murder in Arizona for the shooting death of one Thomas Powell.80 During
72. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(e) (1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(c)(3)(b)
(1995); FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2)(c) (2001).
73. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(a) (1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d) (1995); FLA.
STAT. § 921.141(3) (2001).
74. See Susan Clary, Appeal: Don't Put 2 to Death, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 6,
2002, at B 1.
75. See Liptak, supra note 11; DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS
BY STATE SINCE 1976, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/dpicreg.html (last visited Apr. 10,
2003).
76. See Liptak, supra note 11.
77. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-604 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2001).
78. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-605 (Michie 1997).
79. 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
80. id. at 644-45.
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the separate sentencing hearing, as was mandated by Arizona law,8' the
judge found two aggravating factors.82 The first aggravating factor was that
the murder was committed "in an especially heinous, and cruel or depraved
manner, ' 83 because Walton shot Thomas as Walton held Thomas to the
ground with his foot on Thomas' neck.84 This act was done after Walton and
his two accomplices spoke in front of Thomas about their plan for disposing
him.85 The second aggravating factor was that the murder was "committed,,86
for pecuniary gain. This finding was made because Walton and his
87
accomplices murdered Powell in an effort to steal his car.
In his defense, Walton argued several potential mitigating factors.88
However, the judge found that the aggravating factors outweighed the
89mitigating; therefore, the judge sentenced Walton to death.
The issue before the United States Supreme Court was whether the
Arizona law, which allowed a judge to determine the existence of aggravat-
ing and mitigating circumstances in a separate sentencing hearing, was
constitutional, or did it violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial?90 The Court held that the Arizona capital punishment statute was
constitutional, because the aggravating circumstances were not elements of
the crime, which the jury was required to find.91 Rather, the aggravating
circumstances were merely "sentencing considerations. 92
In justification of its holding, the Court stated that the rule governing a
fact finder in a criminal trial is that the jury must decide questions of fact, asn • 93
it pertains to the elements of the crime. This means that a jury must make
the factual findings to determine guilt or acquittal.94 The Court went on to
say that this rule did not affect the Arizona statute, because the Arizona
statute allowed the jury to make the findings of fact regarding the elements,
81. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(c) (West 1989).
82. Walton, 497 U.S. at 645.
83. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(g)(6) (West 1989).
84. Walton, 497 U.S. at 644.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 645; see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(g)(5) (West 2001 & Supp. 2001).
87. Walton, 497 U.S. at 644.
88. Id at 645.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 642.
91. Id. at 649.
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and thus, the jury determined guilt or acquittal.95  Moreover, during the
sentencing portion of the trial, after the jury judged the elements, the judge
was able to examine factors as "considerations," not elements, and choose
96between death or life imprisonment. In making this determination, the
Court relied on Hildwin v. Florida as precedent.97 Walton attempted to
distinguish the Florida statute by claiming that it used aggravating factors as
• • •98
considerations, and the Arizona statute used them as elements•. The Court
addressed Walton's argument by citing Poland v. Arizona,99 where the Court
stated that "[a]ggravating circumstances are not separate penalties or
offenses, but are 'standards to guide the making of [the] choice' between the
alternative verdicts of death and life imprisonment."'' 00 Thus, under the
Arizona statute, the judge's findings did not result in a conviction or
acquittal, and therefore, were not findings of elements; rather, they were
sentencing considerations. 10
B. Apprendi v. New Jersey
Only ten years after Walton, the United States Supreme Court was,
again, faced with the issue of whether a judge could make a finding of fact
that increased the defendant's sentence. That issue was raised in Apprendi v.
New Jersey.'0 2 In Apprendi, the defendant was charged with "fir[ing] several
.22- caliber bullets into the home of an African-American family that had
recently moved into a previously all-white neighborhood."' 3 At the hearing,
the "grand jury returned a 23-count indictment. '04 The defendant took "a
plea agreement, pursuant to which [the defendant] pleaded guilty to two
counts of second-degree possession of a firearm," and one count of third-
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 490 U.S. 638, 639-40 (1989). In Hildwin, the Court upheld the decision of
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984), and found the Florida statute at issue was
constitutional because "the Sixth Amendment does not require that the specific findings
authorizing the imposition of the sentence of death be made by the jury." Hildwin, 490 U.S.
at 640-41.
98. Walton, 497 U.S. at 648.
99. 476 U.S. 147 (1986).
100. Id. at 156.
101. Walton, 497 U.S. at 648.
102. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
103. Id. at 469.
104. Id.
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degree unlawful possession of an antipersonnel bomb.'05 "[T]he prosecutor
dismissed the [remaining] 20 counts." 0 6 "As part of the plea agreement...
the State reserved the right to request the court to impose a higher 'enhanced
sentence"' on one of the counts, on the basis that it was racially motivated. 
07
Also, as part of the agreement, the defendant reserved the right to challenge
the constitutionality of the hate crime sentencing enhancement.l18
The trial judge accepted the guilty pleas, and upon the prosecutor's
motion for an extended sentence, held an evidentiary hearing.'0 The judge
"concluded that the evidence supported a finding 'that the crime was
motivated by racial bias.""'o Having made this finding "by a preponderance
of the evidence," the judge sentenced the defendant to twelve years• • .111
imprisonment. The statutory maximum for this crime was ten years.1
2
Therefore, the sentence imposed by the trial judge exceeded the statutory
maximum by two years. "
The defendant appealed, stating the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment required that the finding of bias be "proved to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt."' '14 The appellate court affirmed the decision
because the "'hate crime enhancement' [was] a 'sentencing factor,' rather
than an element of an underlying offense, and that decision was within the
State's established power to define the elements of its crimes."' 15 Moreover,
the appellate court stated that the factor in dispute was "motive," which is a
"traditional 'sentencing factor,' one not considered an 'essential ele-
ment.'"' 16
Upon reaching the United States Supreme Court, the issue was whether
the defendant "had a constitutional right to have a jury find such [racial] bias
on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.""' 7 The Court held that a
105. Id. at 469-70.
106. Id. at 470.
107. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 470.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 471 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 143a, State v. Apprendi, 698 A.2d 1265
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997)).
111. Id.
112. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 470.
113. Id. at 471.
114. Id.
115. Id. (citing State v. Apprendi, 698 A.2d 1265 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997)).
116. Id.
117. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 475-76.
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defendant does have that right.' 8 The Court referenced to Jones v. United
States,' 19 and said that:
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the no-
tice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact
(other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty
for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury,
and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 20
Moreover, the Court said the Fourteenth Amendment deserved the same
treatment, and thus, extended the rule to include state courts.'
21
In the Court's analysis of the issue, it stated that nothing throughout
history indicates that it is "impermissible for judges to exercise discretion;"
however, that discretion must be made "within the range prescribed by
statute."'2 To support this proposition, the Court looked at McMillan v.
Pennsylvania,123 where it decided that mandatory minimum sentences were
constitutional because the mandatory minimum was within the range
prescribed by the statute.124 The Court also stated in regard to McMillan,
that as long as the judge "neither alters the maximum penalty for the crime
committed nor creates a separate offense calling for a separate penalty," then
the judge may change the sentence.125
The Court then examined the sole exception to the rule from McMillan.
The exception, according to Almendarez-Torres v. United States,126 is a• . 127
defendant's prior felony conviction. This exception was restated in Jones
as follows: "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."' 21
Thus, the exception would have applied in Apprendi if the defendant had a
prior felony conviction. However, a prior felony conviction was never
118. Id. at 476.
119. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
120. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476 (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 243).
121. Id. at 476.
122. Id. at 481 (emphasis in original).
123. 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
124. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 485-486 (citing McMillan, 477 U.S. at 86-88).
125. Id. at 486 (citing McMillan, 477 U.S. at 86-88).
126. 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
127. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488 (citing Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 230).
128. Id. at 490 (quoting Jones, 526 U.S.at 243).
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introduced; 129 and therefore, the rule from McMillan applied in Apprendi,
leaving the judge without the ability to increase the defendant's sentence
beyond the statutory maximum.
The State presented two arguments in opposition to the Court's
application of the McMillan rule in this case. 30 The Court began with the
State's argument that the "finding of biased purpose is not an 'element"' of
the crime; rather, it is a "sentencing factor."'' 3 The Court disagreed with
New Jersey on this point. 132 The Court stated that the statute required the
judge to make a determination of "whether the defendant possessed, at the
time he committed the subject act, a 'purpose to intimidate' on account
of... race." 133  Thus, the statute required the determination "of the
defendant's state of mind," which is commonly known as mens rea.'34 The
Court went on to say that "[tihe defendant's intent in committing the crime is
perhaps as close as one might hope to come to a core criminal offense
'element.' 1 35 The Court concluded their analysis of this argument by saying
the "relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect-does the required
finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by
the jury's guilty verdict?"' 136
The State's second argument was that the exception created by
Almendarez-Torres allowed the judge to impose a sentence beyond the
maximum provided by the substantive statute under which a defendant is
charged."' This meant that a sentence could be increased above the
maximum if a statute allowed a judge to do so. The Court distinguished
Almendarez-Torres from Apprendi by stating that recidivism had nothing to
do with the New Jersey statute. 138 Instead, "New Jersey's biased purpose
inquiry goes precisely to what happened in the 'commission of the
offense. Thus, the Court was allowing the objective exception of a prior
felony conviction to remain, but eliminating the allowance of any subjective
exceptions found by a judge.
129. Id. at 466.
130. Id. at 492.
131. Id.
132. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 492.
133. Id.
134. Id. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1137 (rev. 4th ed. 1968)).
135. Id. at 493.
136. Id. at 494.
137. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 492.
138. Id. at 496.
139. Id. (quoting Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 244).
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In the final section of the majority opinion it stated that Walton
remained good law, and furthermore, Apprendi did not overrule Walton.'
40
However, as Justice O'Connor pointed out in her dissent, Walton and
Apprendi could not coexist.'4 ' Also in Justice O'Connor's dissent, she
wrote, regarding the conflict between Apprendi and Walton, that "the most
significant impact of the Court's decision will be a practical one-its
unsettling effect on sentencing conducted under current federal and state
determinate-sentencing schemes."' 42  Justice O'Connor felt that "the
Court's decision threaten[s] to unleash a flood of petitions by convicted
defendants seeking to invalidate their sentences in whole or in part on the
authority of the Court's decision [in Apprendi].' Thus, Justice O'Connor
predicted the procedural problems that were certain to ensue because of the
majority's decision.
V. RING V. ARIZONA
As Justice O'Connor predicted,' 44 within two years of its decision, the
Supreme Court was faced with an appeal based on Apprendi. In 2002, the
Court granted certiorari in the case of Ring v. Arizona.145 In Ring, the
defendant, Timothy Stuart Ring, was charged with murder during the
robbery of an armored van with two other accomplices. 46 At trial, "[t]he
jury deadlocked on premeditated murder"' 47 because "'the evidence admitted
at trial failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that [Ring] was a major
participant in the armed robbery or that he actually murdered Magoch, [the
victim]. ' ' ' 148 However, the jury did return a verdict of first-degree felony
murder for Ring's participation in the act. 1
49
Between the guilt phase of the trial and the sentencing hearing, James
Greenham, Ring's accomplice, came forward after accepting a plea
agreement, 50 and testifyed that Ring planned "the robbery for several weeks
before it occurred," and "[took] the role as leader because he laid out all the
140. Id. at 496-97.
141. See id. at 538 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
142. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 550 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 551 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
144. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
145. 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002).
146. Id. at 2432-33.
147. Id. at 2433.
148. Id. at 2434 (quoting State v. Ring, 25 P.3d 1139, 1152 (Ariz. 2001)).
149. Id. at 2433.
150. Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2435.
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tactics."' 5 1 Ring's accomplice went on to say that "Ring shot [Magoch] with
a rifle equipped with a homemade silencer."'' 52 Lastly, Greenham stated that
while the three "were dividing up the money, Ring upbraided him and
Ferguson for 'forgetting to congratulate [Ring] on [his] shot."" 53
At the sentencing hearing, the judge cited Greenham's testimony before
concluding "that Ring '[was] the one who shot and killed Mr. Magoch. ',"154
Based on this conclusion, the judge "turned to the determination of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances." 5 5  The judge "found two
aggravating factors."' 16 First, "that Ring committed the offense in
expectation of receiving something of 'pecuniary value,' as described in
§ 13-703; '[tlaking the cash from the armored car was the motive and reason
for Mr. Magoch's murder and not just the result."",157 "Second, the judge
found that the offense was committed 'in an especially heinous, cruel or
depraved manner."",158  To mitigate the crime, the judge found only one
"factor[,] Ring's 'minimal' criminal record."'' 59
On appeal, Ring challenged the constitutionality of the Arizona statute
under Apprendi, but the Supreme Court of Arizona upheld the sentence
because the majority in Apprendi stated "that Walton remained good law."'' 60
However, the Supreme Court of Arizona went on to confirm that Justice
O'Connor's dissent in Apprendi was correct when she stated that "'[w]ithout
that critical finding [of an aggravating factor], the maximum sentence to
which the defendant [was] exposed is life imprisonment, and not the death
penalty."",16' Therefore, the Supreme Court of Arizona agreed with Justice
O'Connor's interpretation of the Arizona statute.162 However, "the Arizona
court understood that it was bound by the Supremacy Clause to apply
Walton, which [the] Court had not overruled. It therefore rejected Ring's
constitutional attack on the State's capital murder judicial sentencing
system."'
163
151. Id. at 2435 (quoting testimony of Greenham at sentencing hearing).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a, State v. Ring, 25 P.3d 1139 (Ariz. 2001)).





160. Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2436.
161. Id. (quoting State v. Ring, 25 P.3d 1139, 1151 (Ariz. 2001)).
162. See id.
163. Id. (quoting Ring, 25 P.3d at 1152).
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On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the issue was "whether
an aggravating factor may be found by the judge, as Arizona law specifies,
or whether the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee, made applicable to
the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, requires that the aggravating factor
determination be entrusted to the jury[?]" 64 The Court found "that Walton
and Apprendi [were] irreconcilable." 165  Therefore, the Court overruled
Walton, and held that a jury must make such a determination.66
The Court began its analysis of this issue by discussing the cases which
led to this point, Walton and Apprendi.167 The Court stated that in the
Walton holding, the aggravating and mitigating factors were seen "as
'sentencing considerations.""' 68 However, in Apprendi, the Court stated that
a judge could not increase "a defendant's authorized punishment contingent
on the finding of a fact, that fact-no matter how the State labels it-must
be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt."' 169 Furthermore, the Court
restated its reconciliation of the two cases in Apprendi by finding that "[t]he
key distinction.., was that a conviction of first-degree murder in Arizona
carried a maximum sentence of death."'170  However, based upon the
Supreme Court of Arizona's opinion confirming Justice O'Connor's observa-
tion regarding the Arizona statute, it appeared that the maximum sentence
was life imprisonment before the judge made a determination of aggravating
or mitigating factors.
Arizona's first argument was the same argument it made in Walton, that
Ring was sentenced within the range of the law.171 However, unlike in
Walton, the Court stated that the state's argument "overlook[ed] Apprendi's
instruction that 'the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect.' In
effect 'the required finding [of an aggravated circumstance] expose[d]
[Ring] to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty
verdict.'" 172
Arizona's second argument was also based on Walton, which was the
distinction "between elements of an offense and sentencing factors."' 173 The
Court rejected that argument as well, stating that "[a]s to elevation of the
164. Id. at 2437.
165. Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2443.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 2437-40.
168. Id. at 2437 (quoting Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990)).
169. Id. at 2439 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 482-83 (1990)).
170. Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2440.
171. Id.
172. Id. (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494).
173. Id. at 2441.
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maximum punishment... Apprendi repeatedly instructs in that context that
the characterization of a fact or circumstance as an 'element' or a 'sentenc-
ing factor' is not determinative of the question 'who decides,' judge or
jury. ' 74  Thus, the Court appeared to see no difference between an
"element" and a "sentencing factor" if the judge's decision increased the
defendant's sentence beyond the maximum allowed under the statute.
Arizona's third argument was that "'[dleath [was] different,"' and
hence, a judge should make the decision to impose death, rather than a
jury. 175 Arizona based this theory on Furman, which required states to
impose factors to minimize the risk of arbitrary rulings of death sentences.176
Aside from the Eighth Amendment argument, which the Furman Court
relied upon, "Arizona present[ed] 'no specific reason for excepting capital
defendants from the constitutional protections ... extend[ed] to defendants
generally, and none is readily apparent."",177 Moreover, the Court went on to
say that a state legislature could not create laws that restrict one's constitu-
tional protection in order to preserve another.178  However, Arizona
continued that argument by stating "that judicial authority over the finding of
aggravating factors may ... be a better way to guarantee against the arbitrary
imposition of the death penalty."1 79 The Court responded to this version of
the argument by stating that "[t]he Sixth Amendment jury trial right,
however, does not turn on the relative rationality, fairness, or efficiency of
potential factfinders."'' 80 The Court concluded its analysis of this argument
by stating that the majority of states that impose the death penalty do so
without compromising the Eighth Amendment.
In closing, Justice Ginsburg clarified the ruling in this case by stating
"[b]ecause Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operate as 'the
functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense,' the Sixth
Amendment requires that they be found by a j ury."182
Justice O'Connor, again dissenting as she did in Apprendi, stated that
she would have chosen to overrule Apprendi, not Walton.' 83  Justice
O'Connor went on to say that "Apprendi was a serious mistake," and that
174. Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2441 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 492).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 2441-42 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 522-23).
177. Id. at 2442 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 539).
178. See id.
179. Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2442.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 2443 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n.19).
183. Id. at 2448 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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"[t]he Court ha[d] failed, both in Apprendi and in the [Ring] decision.., to
'offer any meaningful justification for deviating from years of cases both
suggesting and holding that application of the increase in the 'maximum
penalty rule' is not required by the Constitution."", 184 Furthermore, Justice
O'Connor stated that the "destabilizing effect" that Apprendi had on the
criminal justice system is disastrous. 85 She went on to opine that "[it is
simply beyond dispute that Apprendi threw countless criminal sentences into
doubt and thereby caused an enormous increase in the workload of an
already overburdened judiciary."' 186  Justice O'Connor concluded by
identifying the four state capital sentencing schemes, other than Arizona's,
that Ring effectively declared unconstitutional: Colorado's, Idaho's,
Montana's, and Nebraska's; and further identified four other states whose
capital sentencing schemes are now in doubt: Alabama's, Delaware's,
Florida's, and Indiana's. 
87
VI. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS OF RING
A. Short-Term
Due to the Court's decision in Ring, states will be required to decide
three very important issues. First, the states must decide whether their
state's death penalty statute was affected by the ruling. Second, if their
statute was affected, whether death row inmates in their state will receive
new sentencing trials or have their sentences commuted to life imprison-
ment, as all death penalty sentences were after the landmark decision of
Furman?188 Finally, if their statute was affected, how will they revise their
death penalty statutes?
184. Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2449 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S.
at 539).
185. Id. at 2449 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 2449-50 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Indiana's new capital sentencing
scheme, which requires a unanimous jury to render the final sentencing decision, went into
effect on July 1, 2002. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.; INDIANA, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/indiana.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2003). Thus, while
Indiana's new capital sentencing scheme appears to be safe from constitutional challenges,
current death row inmates sentenced under the old scheme may have a constitutional claim.
See Death Sentence Laws in Five States Overturned, (June 24, 2002), at
http://www.msnbc.com/news/771488.asp?pne=msn.
188. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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The Ring decision makes the death penalty statutes in Arizona, Idaho,
Montana, Colorado, and Nebraska unconstitutional, 189 because a judge
makes the sole determination in those states of aggravating or mitigating
factors. Thus, the judge is essentially making factual findings to increase the
sentence beyond what the jury finding of guilt deemed appropriate.
Therefore, those state statutes are in direct violation of Ring, and thus,
unconstitutional.
The fate of Alabama, Delaware, and Florida's 190 death penalty statutes
are not so easily determined. In those states, the judge renders a final order
after the jury makes a sentencing recommendation to the judge.' 9' This
process is misleading because one might think that the jury's extended role
makes the statute constitutional. This procedure, however, is unconstitu-
tional. First, since the judge is not required to sentence the defendant in
accordance with the jury's verdict, the judge, in essence, possesses the same
power in these three states as the judge possessed in Arizona. Second, as
Justice Ginsburg said in Ring, the test is in effect, not form.' 92 Therefore, if
you look at the effect of these three state statutes on a defendant's sentencing
hearing, instead of the form, it becomes clearer that the jury's recommenda-
tion means little or nothing, and the judge makes the necessary factual
finding of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Thus, when
Apprendi is applied to the state death penalty statutes of Alabama, Delaware,
and Florida, it appears they will be declared unconstitutional, even though
they have been declared constitutional in the past, 93 as was Walton.'94
All other states possessing the death penalty currently require the jury
to sentence the defendant in capital cases. Meaning, the judge plays no
role in determining whether aggravating or mitigating circumstances are
present. Therefore, those statutes should be unaffected by Ring.
For the eight states mentioned as having unconstitutional death penalty
statutes, their legislatures must decide what procedure to put into place for
the death row inmates who were sentenced under those unconstitutional
189. Liptak, supra note 11.
190. The Supreme Court of Florida has already stayed the executions of two death row
inmates until it can decide how Ring effects, if at all, Florida's death penalty statute. Phil
Long, Florida Supreme Court Halts Two Executions, MIAMI HERALD, July 9, 2002, at A2. The
Supreme Court of Florida's decision is expected in the Fall of 2002. Id.
191. Liptak, supra note 11.
192. Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2440.
193. Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447
(1984).
194. Walton v. Arizona, 497 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
195. Liptak, supra note 11.
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sentencing procedures. For example, after Furman was decided, all inmates
on death row had their sentences commuted to life. 196 The states at that time
did not have the aggravating or mitigating circumstances in place to offer as
sentencing guidelines for juries and judges. Therefore, commuting the
sentences appears to have been the only viable choice. However, at this
moment, other state death penalty statutes can work as a model for a
constitutional statute, and new sentencing hearings are more possible. Thus,
it is just a matter of whether the states are willing to spend the money and
time to provide new sentencing hearings.
Regardless of whether the affected states create a new death penalty
statute for new sentencing hearings, or the states choose to commute the
death sentences to life imprisonment, they must still decide how to create a
new capital punishment statute for future offenders. Three obvious options
exist. First, the affected states can model their statutes after a state statute
that has not been declared unconstitutional, and thus, require a jury to make
the final sentencing decision. Second, an affected state can attempt to
cleverly structure a statute where the judge still has some input in the
process, in hopes that the Supreme Court will find the new statute constitu-
tional. One thing is certain, a state cannot get around Ring by making death
the mandatory sentence, and allowing the judge to lower the sentence to life
in prison, because this idea was struck down in Furman.'97 Finally, the state
can abolish the death penalty. While this may be possible in some of the
affected states, those such as Florida may find this option politically
impossible since it executes such a high number of prisoners,198 and a large
majority of the public supports its use.
196. See John W. Poulos, The Supreme Court, Capital Punishment and the Substantive
Criminal Law: The Rise and Fall of Mandatory Capital Punishment, 28 ARIz. L. REV. 143,
145 (1986).
197. Howe, supra note 34, at 406 (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976) (rejecting the North Carolina system)); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976)
(rejecting the Louisiana statute)).
198. Florida has ranked fourth on the list for most executions since 1976. DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CTR., NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS BY STATE SINCE 1976, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/dpicreg.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2003).
199. Staff, Opinion Editorial, THE NEwS-PRESS (Ft. Myers, Fla.), Jan. 18, 2003, at 8B.
"Support for the death penalty remains high [in Florida] at about 70 percent .... " Id.
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B. Long-Term
The long-term effects of Ring are fewer in number, but possibly greater
in value.200 Ring might not bring an end to the death penalty, but it could
decrease the number of defendants sentenced to death. According to Ronald
J. Tabak, the co-chairman of an American Bar Association committee on the
death penalty, "[flar, far, far more often when the judges override the jury, it
is in order to impose the death penalty when the jury has recommended
life." 20' Mr. Tabak stated that this is evident in those states, such as Florida
202
and Alabama, where the jury only Provides a sentencing recommendation,
but the judge still has the final say. Thus, if all eight states where death
penalty statutes have been called into question are forced to change their
death sentencing procedure, then there might be a reduction in the number of
death sentences rendered in the future.
VII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Court succeeded in providing some clarity of
Apprendi in Ring, but left an unsettling question for some states as to Ring's
range. The Court has experienced difficulty in determining how to allow
states to apply the death penalty. This difficulty apparently began in 1972
with Furman, extended through 1990 with Walton, and apparently has
continued through 2002 with Ring. It is possible that inevitable appeals from
states such as Alabama, Florida, and Delaware will clarify Ring's impact
even more, but unfortunately, death row inmates in those states will have to
wait patiently until the Supreme Court decides to revisit the issue-once
again.
200. If you value life over questionable deterrence and retribution, then less executions
might provide a greater value.
201. Liptak, supra note 11.
202. "James S. Liebman, [a law professor at Columbia University], said that: 'about a
quarter of the death row in Alabama is made up of people whom juries sentenced to life in
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